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MENTAL RETARDATION-FEDERAL STATUTORY RIGHT TO HABILITATIONSTATE STATUTORY RIGHT TO HABILITATION-REMEDIES-The

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that
federal and Pennsylvania statutory law grants mentally retarded persons a right to habilitation in the least restrictive environment.
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980) (No. 79-1404).
In 1974, a retarded resident of Pennhurst State School and Hospital
filed a class action suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania' against Pennhurst 2 alleging that
large, isolated institutions such as Pennhurst cannot provide minimally
adequate habilitation' guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 4 the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act,5
and the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of
1966.6 The district court found that the only constitutionally justifiable
purpose for which a mentally retarded person can be deprived of liberty
is habilitation which will maximize growth potential by providing the
opportunity to acquire the life skills necessary to live as normally as
1. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
affd in part and rev'd and remanded in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert
granted, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980) (No. 79-1404). The class included present Pennhurst

residents and all mentally retarded persons who might be placed there in the future. Id.
at 1300. The United States and the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens
(PARC) were allowed to intervene as plaintiffs. Id. at 1301.
2. The defendants included Pennhurst State School and Hospital, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and officials of Philadelphia County and four of the suburban
counties surrounding Philadelphia which committed retarded citizens to Pennhurst. Also
named as defendants were those state and local officials responsible for placement in and
the operation of Pennhurst. Id. at 1301-02 & n.13.
3. Id. at 1308-10. Habilitation is the education, training, and care necessary for mentally retarded individuals to maximize their developmental potential. The terms treatment
and habilitation are used interchangeably although mental retardation is not a disease and
therefore technically not susceptible to treatment. Id. at 1314. The plaintiffs also alleged
inhumane and dangerous conditions such as insufficient supervision resulting in the infliction of physical injuries, sanitation defects, improper use of physical restraints and
psychotropic drugs, lack of diet control, and the use of seclusion rooms to punish
undesirable behavior. Id. at 1307-10. The defendants did not dispute the existence of these
conditions. 612 F.2d at 92.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976) (amended 1978) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. II
1978)).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (1976) (amended 1978) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§
6001-6081 (1976 & Supp. II 1978)).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1980).
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his capabilities permit. Pennhurst and similar institutions were determined to be inherently unable to provide adequate habilitation because
they segregate and isolate rather than reflect the normal atmosphere
of family life in the community.' Therefore, the court held that commitment to a large state institution bears no reasonable relationship to a
legitimate government purpose and impermissibly infringes upon the
liberty interests guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment If the state chooses to commit for habilitation, it
must provide constitutionally adequate habilitation.'
The district court further held that the state must habilitate in the
setting least restrictive of personal liberty which is consistent with the
individual's needs. Because the court determined that adequate habilitation can only be provided outside the institution, confinement to
Pennhurst violates due process by confining the retarded in an environment more restrictive than necessary for habilitation."0 As well as
finding a constitutional right to habilitation, the district court recognized a constitutional right to nondiscriminatory habilitation. The
court held that commitment to Pennhurst violates fourteenth amendment equal protection rights by segregating patients because of retardation without providing training and educational services equal to
those provided by the Commonwealth to the nonretarded."
In addition to the constitutional basis for its holding, the district
court found a federal statutory right to nondiscriminatory
7. 446 F. Supp. at 1315-18. The court agreed with the principles of normalization
under which mentally retarded persons are treated as much like nonretarded of the same
age as their capabilities permit. Expectation of this higher level of performance enables
them to maximize their growth potential. Id. at 1311.
8. Id. at 1315-18.
9. Id. at 1318. The district court found Pennhurst's habilitation program inappropriate and inadequate and attributed these deficiencies in part to severe staff shortages and record keeping which failed to meet minimal professional standards. Id. at
1304-05, 1306 n.31. Because of understaffing, the average Pennhurst resident received only
15 minutes of beneficial programming each day.' The court found that Pennhurst had failed to

keep records delineating individual habilitative programming, progress reports, and
discharge plans designed to assist each resident in an eventual return to the community.
Existing hospital records indicated that the lack of adequate habilitation resulted in the
emotional and intellectual deterioration of most Pennhurst residents. Id. at 1309-10. The
district court, however, denied damages for these physical and emotional injuries because
the defendants had acted in good faith and were therefore immune from liability. Id. at
1324. The court held that these injuries, including physical and sexual abuse, the
deplorable living conditions, and the improper use of chemical and mechanical restraints,
violated the residents' eighth and fourteenth amendment rights to be free from harm. Id.
at 1320-21.
10. Id. at 1319-20. These restrictions include abridgements of the right to travel, the
freedom of association, the right to marry and raise a family, and the right to privacy.
11. Id. at 1321-22.
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habilitation." The court interpreted section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 197313 to prohibit unnecessarily separate and inadequate services to the handicapped."' Therefore, the plaintiffs' federal statutory
right to nondiscriminatory habilitation is violated by confinement to an
institution with a habilitation program which fails to meet minimum
standards. 5 The district court also found a state statutory right to
minimally adequate habilitation in the Pennsylvania Mental Health and
Mental Retardation Act of 1966.1"
The district court banned admissions to Pennhurst, ordered the institution to be closed, 7 and appointed a special master to plan and
supervise the implementation of future court orders. 8 The court mandated creation of community living arrangements for all current and
future Pennhurst residents 9 and ordered that individualized habilitation programs be formulated for each member of the plaintiff class.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, en bane,2
affirmed the district court's ruling that the mentally retarded have a
federal and a state statutory right to habilitation in the least restrictive environment, and, therefore, did not reach the constitutional
issues discussed by the district court.'
12.

Id. at 1323-24. The district court addressed the constitutional issues before

reaching the federal and state statutory issues. This is contrary to the Supreme Court's
mandate that the courts not decide constitutional issues unnecessarily. Rescue Army v.
Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 572-73 (1947).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976) (amended 1978) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. II
1978)).
14. 446 F. Supp. at 1323. The district court concluded that § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 is a codification of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Because the court found a violation of the residents' constitutional right to equal protection, it also found a violation of their federal statutory right to nondiscriminatory habilitation. The court also held that § 504 imposes affirmative duties on state officials and confers a private right of action to enforce these duties. Id. at 1323.
15. Id. at 1323-24.
16. Id. at 1322. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1980).
17. The district court's order to close Pennhurst was reversed by the court of appeals. 612 F.2d 84, 113-16.
18. 446 F. Supp. at 1326-29.
19. The district court did not define community living arrangements. Id. at 1326-27.
20. Id. at 1326.
21. A three-judge panel initially heard the case on January 9, 1979. Because a majority did not support a single opinion, the case was heard en bane. The court en bane reserved judgment on motions for a stay pending appeal except that the district court's
order was stayed. Thus stayed, the order would not apply to transfers out of Pennhurst
without a parent or guardian's written consent. 612 F.2d at 90.
22. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 94 (1979) (en bane),
cert granted, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980) (No. 79-1404). The circuit court also affirmed the right
of the United States to intervene as a plaintiff. Id. at 90-92.
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Judge Gibbons, writing for the majority,2 found a federal statutory
right to habilitation under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act.' The court found congressional intent to grant
persons with developmental disabilities a right to habilitation in the
language of the Bill of Rights section of the Act which specifically
states that retarded persons have a right to appropriate habilitation.'
The court found additional evidence of legislative intent in the duty
imposed by the Act on state governments to withhold public funds
from institutions or residential programs which do not provide appropriate habilitation or do not meet the minimum standards set forth
in the Bill of Rights section.26 Moreover, the Act requires states receiving funds under the Act to submit to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services a program for the improved care of, and improved
physical environment for, the institutionalized developmentally disabled.' The court also determined that the legislative history of the
Bill of Rights section of the Act supports recognition of a statutory
right to habilitation.'
23. Judges Rosenn, Weis, Garth, Higginbotham, and Sloviter joined in the majority
opinion. Id. at 88, 116.
24. 612 F.2d at 96. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (1976) (amended 1978). Although
Halderman and PARC had alleged violations of their statutory rights under the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act in an amended complaint in
the district court, 612 F.2d at 89, 95, the district court relied solely on § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in holding that the federal statutory rights of the plaintiff class
had been violated. 446 F. Supp. at 1323-24.
25. 612 F.2d at 96. 42 U.S.C. § 6010(1) (1976) provides: "Persons with developmental
disabilities have a right to appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation for such
disabilities." The Act defined developmental disabilities as mental retardation, epilepsy,
autism, and cerebral palsy. 42 U.S.C. § 6001(7) (1976) (amended 1978) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 6001(7) (Supp. II 1978)). See note 63 infra.
26. 612 F.2d at 96. 42 U.S.C. § 6010(3) (1976) provides in relevant part:
(3) The Federal Government and the States both have an obligation to assure
that public funds are not provided to any institutional or other residential program
for persons with developmental disabilities that(A) does not provide treatment, services, and habilitation which is appropriate to the needs of such persons; or
(B) does not meet the following minimum standards ....
The minimum standards include provision of a well-balanced diet and sufficient medical
and dental care. Physical restraints used as punishment or when not absolutely necessary
and chemical restraints are banned and cannot be substituted for habilitation programs.
Id. § 6010(3)(B)(i)-(iv).
27. 612 F.2d at 96. See 42 U.S.C. § 6063(b)(20)(B) (1976). Although this subsection was
deleted in the 1978 revision of the Act, the court found the section legally significant
because it was in effect when the cause of action accrued. 612 F.2d at 96.
28. 612 F.2d at 96. See 121 CONG. REC. 16516-19 (1975). The Bill of Rights section of
the Act had been passed in response to testimony on the shockingly inhumane conditions
at large institutions for the retarded. Id. at 16516-17. The Senate version had contained a
delineation of standards for institutional and community care, but in conference the
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The court further determined that the state's duty under the Act to
provide appropriate habilitation to the developmentally disabled can
be enforced by retarded persons through a private right of action.'
Although the Act does not expressly provide a private right of action,W
the court found that implication of a private right of action satisfied
the standards articulated by the Supreme Court for determining
whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute."
In addition to the federal statutory right to habilitation, the court
found a state statutory right to habilitation in the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966"2 which imposes a duty
on the Commonwealth to provide adequate services to the mentally
retarded in facilities which it maintains.' The court found in the
Senate version was dropped and the present Bill of Rights section was adopted as a compromise, recognizing the right of the developmentally disabled to receive treatment for
their handicap. 612 F.2d at 106-07. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 42,
reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 943, 961.
29. 612 F.2d at 97.
30. According to the express provisions of the Act, the federal government can enforce a state's duty by withholding funds to those programs which do not provide appropriate habilitation or meet minimal standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 6010(3) (1976). See note
26 supra. The federal government could also sue states for breach of contract if they accept funds but violate the Act. United States v. Mattson, 600 F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir.
1979).

31. 612 F.2d at 97-98. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). Applying the Cort v.
Ash criteria to the Act, the circuit court determined that: (1) the mentally retarded are
especial beneficiaries of the Act, (2) Congress had recognized the desirability of judicial
enforcement of the Act, (3) permitting private enforcement would further the goals of the
Act, and (4) enforcement of the congressional recognition of a right to treatment in the
Bill of Rights section of the Act does not displace the states' traditional function in formulation of mental health policies. 612 F.2d at 97-98. The court found that the Bill of
Rights section was enacted pursuant to § 5 of the fourteenth amendment; therefore, there
is no unconstitutional infringement of the state's prerogative to provide habilitation. Id. at
89. The Halderman court pointed to provisions in the Act that conditioned the state's
right to receive federal funds on the provision of adequate habilitation and decided that
the condition is a valid use of Congress' spending powers and not a usurpation of the
state's traditional function of providing services to the mentally retarded. Id. at 99. See 42
U.S.C. § 6063(b) (1976) (amended 1978). The court relied on the reasoning of Naughton v.
Bevilacqua, 458 F. Supp. 610 (D.R.I. 1978), affd in part and decision reserved in part, 605
F.2d 586 (1st Cir. 1979), the only previous case that had implied a private cause of action
under the Act. The Naughton court held that the Act gave a private cause of action to a
schizophrenic, retarded child who was injured by a drug administered in a state institution. In Naughton the court concluded that Congress intended to protect and assure the
right to habilitation and that the right cannot be effectively enforced solely by
withholding federal funds for violations of the Act. Id. at 616.
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4201 (Purdon 1969).
33. 612 F.2d at 100-01. The court noted that the Act obligates the state to provide
adequate habilitation only to the extent that the state undertakes to maintain facilities for
the mentally handicapped. Id. at 102. The court did not find that Pennsylvania law required provision for the least restrictive environment possible. See id. at 100-03.
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legislative history of the Pennsylvania Act an intent to provide individualized treatment to mentally retarded persons., The court also
noted that implication of a right to habilitation under the Act is consistent with the scant Pennsylvania case law interpreting the Act to provide a right to treatment and habilitation. 5 Judge Gibbons also held
that the counties and the Commonwealth are responsible for the provision of all habilitation services including community living arrangements even though the duty to provide community living arrangements is not one of the duties enumerated in the Act. 8 The court
rejected the defendants' contention that the Pennsylvania statutory
7
right to habilitation is conditioned on the availability of funding.'
After finding a federal and a state statutory right to habilitation,
the court held that the mentally retarded have a federal right to
receive habilitation in the setting which is least restrictive consistent
with individual habilitative needs.' Judge Gibbons found a congressional preference for deinstitutionalization in the statutory language
and legislative history of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act. 9 Congress' preference for deinstitutionalization cannot, however, be interpreted as a per se prohibition of institutionalization.'" Judge Gibbons concluded that institutionalization may qualify as
the least restrictive alternative for certain individuals if coupled with
appropriate habilitation and decent living conditions."
34. Id. at 100-01. See PA. LEGIS. J. 3d Spec. Sess., No. 33, 76-78 (Sept. 27, 1966)
(remarks of Senator Pecham).
35. 612 F.2d at 101. See Hoolick v. Retreat State Hosp., 24 Pa. Commw. Ct. 218, 220,
354 A.2d 609, 611 (1976), affd, 476 Pa. 317, 382 A.2d 739 (1978) (Act is a comprehensive
program to provide care and treatment of mentally retarded persons); In re Joyce Z., 123
Pittsb. Leg. J. 181, 187, 4 Pa. D. & C.3d 596 (C.P. Allegheny 1978) (Act provides a right to
treatment to the profoundly retarded which cannot be met by placement in an overcrowded state institution).
36. 612 F.2d at 103. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4301(d) (Purdon 1969) (local
authorities, in cooperation with the Department of Public Welfare, shall insure the
availability of inpatient, outpatient, emergency, and aftercare services as well as interim
care for those awaiting admission to state institutions and sheltered workshops).
37. 612 F.2d at 102. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4509(5) (Purdon 1969).
38. 612 F.2d at 104.
39. Id. at 104-07. 42 U.S.C. § 6010(2) (1976) provides: "The treatment, services and
habilitation for a person with developmental disabilities should be designed to maximize
the developmental potential of the person and should be provided in the setting that is
least restrictive of the person's personal liberty."
40. 612 F.2d at 106-07. See, e.g., 121 CONG. REC. 16520 (1975) (community habilitation
programs should be encouraged although there will always be a need for some long-term
residential programs).
41. 612 F.2d at 107. An institution may be the best environment suited to fulfill the
habilitation needs of elderly, profoundly retarded, or multiply-handicapped persons. Id. at
114.
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The court of appeals remanded the case to the district court, stressing that both the right to habilitation and the right to the least restrictive environment can be vindicated only through an investigation of
the needs of each plaintiff class member and through the development
of individualized programs to meet these needs.2 The court mandated
that each plaintiff class member or his next friend participate in the
formulation of the individual habilitation program. The court recognized that this process could result in a determination that a properly
run institution is the least restrictive setting consistent with the
habilitation needs of some retarded persons.
Chief Judge Seitz, writing in dissent," stated that, as long as state
institutions are free of the deplorable conditions that existed at Pennhurst, the state has some discretion in placing retarded individuals in
settings appropriate to their needs.'5 He maintained that even if the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act grants
Pennhurst residents a right to habilitation and a private cause of action to enforce it, the Act does not impose a duty on the defendants to
provide habilitation in the least restrictive environment. Finding
evidence in the Act that a state's limited resources may qualify its duty,4" he concluded that a duty to support feasible noninstitutional care
could not be elevated to a duty to provide the least restrictive treatment regardless of cost and resources. 8
Chief Judge Seitz further maintained that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, relied on by the district court as the federal
statutory source of a right to adequate habilitation in the least restrictive setting, also imposes no duty on the states to create less restrictive habilitation facilities, but merely provides financial incentives to
do so. 9 Similarly, according to the dissenter, the Pennsylvania Mental
42. Id. at 114-15.
43. Id. at 114, 116.
44. Chief Judge Seitz was joined in his dissent by Judges Aldisert and Hunter. Id. at
116 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 117 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Seitz cautioned that federal courts
should not become involved in supervising state mental health facilities but should intervene only in very limited circumstances to remove a person from an institution or to
forbid a particular mode of treatment. Id.
46. Id. at 119 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 118-19 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). See 42 U.S.C. § 6003 (1976) (states have
primary control over allocation of the funds).
48. 612 F.2d at 119 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 120 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, 720-721, 762 (1976)
(amended 1978) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, 720-721, 762 (1976 & Supp. H 1978))
(Act is a funding statute to aid severely handicapped). The majority did not base the right
to the least restrictive environment on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, but on the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. 612 F.2d at 107-08.
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Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 does not mandate that
habilitation be provided in the least restrictive setting regardless of
financial feasibility. 5 Chief Judge Seitz argued that the Commonwealth's statutory duty under the Pennsylvania Act to provide
habilitation can be fulfilled by a properly run institution.' He noted
that the Pennsylvania Act cannot be interpreted to mandate deinstitutionalization because the statute was enacted four years before community living arrangements were used by the state, and the legislative
scheme provided for both institutions and community based facilities
without evidencing a preference for either. 2
Chief Judge Seitz next examined the due process arguments relied
on by the district court' and found a legitimate government purpose in
the involuntary confinement of severely and profoundly retarded persons because they are unable to live independently.' Because some
mentally retarded persons need care and supervision for their own
protection, he concluded that significant restrictions on their personal
liberty are permissible if these restrictions are reasonably related to
the provision of services for those retarded persons who are unable to
survive without them. He therefore rejected a due process right to the
least restrictive environment. 5 He acknowledged, however, that the
availability of less restrictive environments is a factor to consider in
evaluating the reasonableness of a challenged restraint on personal
liberty."6 Finally, Chief Judge Seitz rejected the district court's finding
50. Id. at 123 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Judge maintained that the Pennsylvania Act was an unexpressed ground for the majority's recognition of a right to the
least restrictive environment, and, therefore, he addressed the issue of a state statutory
right to the least restrictive environment even though the majority did not. He
noted that the Pennsylvania Act's delineation of the state's duties does not mention a duty to
provide the least restrictive treatment. Id. at 122. (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4201-4202 (Purdon 1969) (Pennsylvania's duties include providing adequate
mental health and retardation services, assisting the counties in providing services, and
operating state facilities).
51. 612 F.2d at 123 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 122 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 123 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
Because the majority found a statutory basis for the right to the least restrictive environment, it did not reach the constitutional issues. See 612 F.2d at 94.
54. Id. at 125 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 129 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Seitz assumed arguendo that a due
process right to habilitation exists. Id. at 124 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 129 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Seitz rejected the less drastic
means analysis articulated in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960), which requires
an evaluation of the extent of the legislative abridgement of fundamental personal liberties in light of less drastic means available for achieving the same substantial governmental purpose. Chief Judge Seitz contended that although the less drastic means analysis is
of value in first amendment cases where an objective determination of a single better
alternative can be made, it is ill suited to test the constitutionality of institutions such as
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of equal protection and eighth amendment violations," concluding that
the states may constitutionally institutionalize mentally retarded persons for care and supervision as long as the institution is properly
58
run.
Halderman is the first decision finding a right to habilitation under
the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. The
Halderman decision is also the first to recognize a right to the least
restrictive environment under the Act.59 Before Halderman, other
federal courts had recognized a constitutional right to habilitation in
the least restrictive setting for the institutionalized retarded. These
courts based their analyses on the constitutional rights retarded
residents possess because of their confinement in state-run instituPennhurst. The ideal balance between freedom and supervision will be different for each
resident, and the balance for each resident will change with time. 612 F.2d at 128 (Seitz,
C.J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 130 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). See note 9 and text accompanying note 11
supra. Chief Judge Seitz maintained that the mentally retarded are not a suspect class
because the legal disabilities imposed on them are related, although sometimes imperfectly, to their inabilities. Therefore, Pennsylvania's segregation of some retarded citizens
through institutionalization is constitutional because it is reasonably related to providing
care and supervision. 612 F.2d at 130 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting). Likewise, institutionalization
does not violate the residents' eighth amendment right to be free from harm because it
bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate government objective and, therefore, is not
punishment. Id.
58. Pennhurst was not being operated in a constitutional manner. See notes 3 & 9
supra.

/\

59. The district court in Naughton v. Bevilacqua, 458 F. Supp. 610 (D.R.I. 1978), affd,
605 F.2d 586 (st Cir. 1979), held that the Bill of Rights section of the Act was violated by
the use of unnecessary medication to control rather than habilitate the plaintiff. 458 F.
Supp. at 614. See 42 U.S.C. § 6010(3(B)(iv) (1976) (states required to ensure that federal
funds are not provided for programs which use chemical restraints as a substitute for
habilitation or in quantities that interfere with habilitation). However, on appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit specifically reserved opinion as to whether the Act
gives substantive rights and whether the rights are enforceable by individuals. 605 F.2d
at 588 & n.3.
60. See, e.g., Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1219 (E.D. La. 1976) (Constitution requires that persons confined by the state must receive programming proper to
their individual needs); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1203-12 (N.D. Ohio 1974)
(adopting standards to assure constitutionally adequate habilitation in state institutions);
Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 495 (D. Minn. 1974) (defining substantive due process
right to habilitation as a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve mental condition),
affd in part and remanded in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977) (remanded to modify
remedy); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (existence of constitutional right to treatment which will give institutionalized persons a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve their mental condition), implemented in 344 F. Supp. 387
(M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part, remanded in part and decision reserved in part sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (declined to consider order to force state
to budget money).
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tions.6 1 Institutions substantially infringe on the liberty interests of
those confined.2 Therefore, in order to be constitutional, commitment
must be justified by a compelling state interest such as habilitation.
The Halderman court, in using the Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act as a basis for its decision, has expanded the constitutional right afforded to the institutionalized mentally retarded by prior courts. The language of the Act extends the
right to habilitation to all persons who are developmentally disabled, 3
not only those in state-run institutions. Because the plaintiff class in
Halderman included those mentally retarded persons eligible for admission to Pennhurst,64 the direct impact of the decision would be to
extend the right to habilitation in the least restrictive setting beyond
patients in state-run institutions to some mentally retarded persons for
whom a constitutional right to habilitation has not been recognized.
Halderman is also the first case to hold that the least restrictive environment must be noninstitutional if the individual's habilitative
needs so require. 5 Again relying on the Act, the Halderman court
presumed that community living arrrangements are the least restrictive environment consistent with the habilitation needs of most mentally retarded and ordered creation of alternatives to institutionalization." Federal courts previously had held that the due process right to
habilitation in the least restrictive environment can be implemented by
61. In Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), the court held that
residents of state institutions are entitled to the least restrictive conditions necessary to
receive habilitation. Id. at 395. The court in Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D.
La. 1976), elaborated on the due process argument, declaring that the state must provide
a benefit such as treatment if the state chooses to confine a noncriminal and the treatment must be reasonably designed to effect the purpose of the confinement. The district
court held that the state must provide treatment in the least restrictive setting available.
Id. at 1216-18. See notes 96 & 98 and accompanying text infra.
62. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
63. The Act defines the term developmental disability as:
[A] severe, chronic disability of a person which-(A) is attributable to a mental or
physical impairment or combination of mental and physical impairments ... (C) is
likely to continue indefinitely [and] (D) results in substantial functional limitations
in three or more of the following areas of major life activity: (i) self-care, (i) receptive and expressive language, (iii) learning, (iv) mobility, (v) seif-direction, (vi)
capacity for independent living, and (vii) economic self sufficiency....
42 U.S.C. § 6001(7) (Supp. 11 1978). See note 25 supra.
64. See note 1 supra.
65. See 612 F.2d at 115-16.
66. Id. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6010(2) (1976). See also 42 U.S.C. § 6063(b)(20), (23), (26) (1976)
(amended 1978) (until 1978 these subsections required submission of state plans to
eliminate inappropriate treatment and state support of the establishment of community
programs which utilize all available community resources as alternatives to institutionalization).
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developing institutional life styles in accordance with the principles of
normalization. Some courts had concluded that the least restrictive
environment for treatment must be provided when available, but the
state has no obligation to create noninstitutional facilities." HaIderman
assures members of the plaintiff class the right to live in a setting
which will meet all their habilitative needs.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari"9 to hear an appeal from
the circuit court's decision in Halderman. The Court will be faced with
several issues of first impression, including whether the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act grants an absolute
right to habilitation in the least restrictive environment.
The Bill of Rights section of the Act was relied on by the Third Circuit as the basis for a mentally retarded person's right to habilitation
in the least restrictive environment. ' The other portions of the Act require only plans for the improved care of those persons requiring institutional care and support for the establishment of alternatives to institutionalization.7 1 The Bill of Rights section can be interpreted either
as a preamble which merely enumerates the purposes of the Act or as
an integral part of the operative portion of the Act. 72 If the operative
parts of a statute are clear and unambiguous, the preamble does not
67. See Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. at 502; Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. at 393.
See note 7 and accompanying text supra. But cf. Mason & Menolascino, The Right to
Treatment for Mentally Retarded Citizens: An Evolving Legal and Scientific Interface,
10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 124, 156-57 (1976) (criticizes as antithetical to the principles of normalization the Welsch and Wyatt courts' failure to remedy the isolational and segregational aspects of institutionalization).
68. See Eckerhart v. Hensley, 475 F. Supp. 908, 922 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (involuntarily
confined mental patient must remain in maximum security hospital until there is an opening in a less restrictive facility); Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92, 125-26 (N.D. Ohio 1979)
(holding that due process requires treatment of the institutionalized mentally ill to be only
as restrictive of personal liberty as treatment of noninstitutionalized mentally ill and
remedying plaintiffs' complaint of isolation from community by ordering more frequent
bus transportation between the state hospital and the community); Eubanks v. Clarke, 434
F. Supp. 1022, 1028 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (involuntarily committed mental patients have right to
be committed in least restrictive setting the state has available); Gary W. v. Louisiana,
437 F. Supp. 1209, 1218-19 (E.D. La. 1976) (the state need not create new systems of noninstitutional care).
69. Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980) (No.
79-1404).
70. See notes 25, 26 & 39 and accompanying text supra.
71. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6011-6012 (1976) (amended 1978) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§
6011-6012 (1976 & Supp. II 1978)) (requiring that the state maintain individual habilitation
plans and an advocacy system). See also 42 U.S.C. § 6063(b)(7)(A)-(B) (1978 Supp.) (state
must submit a plan including maximum use of community resources and protecting
employees affected by provision of alternative community living arrangements).
72. Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 10, Commissioners and Mental HealthlMental
Retardation Adm'rs for Bucks County v. Halderman, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980) (No. 79-1415).
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control their meaning."3 Therefore, if the Supreme Court finds the Bill
of Rights section to be a preamble, it may hold that the right to treatment expressed therein does not impose enforceable duties on the
state. The 1978 amendment to the Bill of Rights section indicates that
the section describes new substantive rights and does not merely state
the goals of the Act or reiterate rights found in other statutes or the
Constitution."4 Additionally, the legislative history of the Act supports
the Halderman court's conclusion that Congress, in including the Bill of
Rights section in the Act, wished to protect the rights of the developmentally disabled.75 The Court's interpretation of the Bill of Rights section of the Act will determine whether it recognizes a right to habilitation in the least restrictive environment under the Act.
If the Supreme Court decides that the Act provides plaintiffs with a
right to habilitation in the least restrictive environment, it must next
decide whether plaintiffs have a cause of action to enforce the right.
The circuit court implied a private right of action under the Act," but
the Supreme Court may find an alternative basis for granting a cause
of action. The Supreme Court has been wary of implying a private
right of action unnecessarily, 77 and recently declined to decide whether
a private cause of action exists under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, another statute designed to further the interests of the
handicapped, because it decided the case on its merits. 8 The Court, in
granting certiorari in Halderman, asked the parties to submit briefs on
73. See, e.g., Association of Am. R.Rs. v. Costle, 562 F.2d 1310, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(if operative parts of statute are clear and unambiguous their meaning cannot be controlled by preamble); Hughes Tool Co. v. Muir, 486 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir. 1973) (preamble does not control operative parts when operative parts are clear and unambiguous).
74. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 507, 92 Stat. 3007 (1978) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 6010
(1976)). The amendment adds: "The rights of persons with developmental disabilities
described in findings made in this section are in addition to any constitutional or other
rights otherwise afforded to all persons." Id.
75. See 612 F.2d at 106-07. See note 28 supra.
76. 612 F.2d at 97-100. The Halderman court utilized the criteria for implying a
private cause of action set forth by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
See note 31 supra. See also Michigan Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Smith, 475 F. Supp.
990 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (holding that federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction under
the Act to hear class action suits brought by mentally retarded residents of state
facilities, but also noting subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1978) and
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) which provide private causes of action to individuals to redress
violations of their civil rights). Two federal circuit courts have concluded that the Act
does not authorize suits by the United States to enforce the rights of the retarded. See
United States v. Mattson, 600 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Solomon, 563
F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1977).
77. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977).
78. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
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whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983,"9 which gives a cause of action to redress
deprivation of constitutional or statutory rights under color of state
law, provides a basis for the Court to hear the suit." Pennsylvania's involvement in the operation of Pennhurst and other mental retardation
programs provides the requisite state action for a section 1983 cause of
action. 8 Thus, the Halderman litigation may not ultimately determine
the existence of a private right of action under the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act.
If the Supreme Court negates the existence of a federal statutory
right to habilitation in the least restrictive environment, it will reach
the issue of whether a constitutional right to habilitation in the least
restrictive environment should be recognized. The Supreme Court in
1975 in O'Connor v. Donaldson, addressed a similar issue declaring
that "a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by
himself-or with the help of willing and responsible family members."82
The Court in O'Connor found that the plaintiff's constitutional right to
liberty had been violated because he had been involuntarily confined at
a state institution for the mentally ill without receiving treatment. The
plaintiff was neither dangerous to others nor unable to survive safely
without care and supervision.8 3 The O'Connor Court explicitly refused
to decide whether persons committed as dangerous to themselves or
others must receive treatment.8 4
Although O'Connor dealt with similar issues, there are three major
distinctions between O'Connor and Halderman: (1) O'Connor was involuntarily committed while some members of the plaintiff class are
voluntary patients at Pennhurst, (2) O'Connor was mentally ill, not
mentally retarded, and (3) O'Connor was committed solely for treatment whereas most Pennhurst residents need care and supervision as
well as treatment." The Halderman court explicitly included voluntary
patients as well as involuntary patients in its holding, maintaining that
79.

Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
80. 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980) (No. 79-1404).
81. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
82. 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 573.
84. Id. at 571.
85. See note 90 infra.
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voluntariness in this context is illusory. 8 Many retarded residents are
physically unable to express an interest in leaving Pennhurst, or cannot understand the available alternatives to institutionalization. Others
will be involuntarily committed if they wish to leave Pennhurst and
the staff determines that no suitable community living arrangement is
available. 7 The Court may agree with the circuit court that there is no
significant difference between voluntary and involuntary commitment,
or it may remand the case for redefinition of the plaintiff class to exclude voluntary patients.
Another distinction between O'Connorand Halderman is that O'Connor was mentally ill, not retarded. The Supreme Court in Kremens v.
Bartley' cautioned that close attention must be paid to the differences
between the mentally ill and the mentally retarded but did not specify
what those differences were."
One difference between the mentally ill and the mentally retarded is
that, like O'Connor, some mentally ill persons who are not dangerous
to others or unable to survive safely in freedom are committed solely
for treatment. Most mentally retarded residents of state institutions,
however, need care and supervision as well as habilitation." Depending
on what the Court recognizes to be the constitutional justification for
commitment, this distinction may present the Court with a question
86. 612 F.2d at 94.
87. Id.
88. 431 U.S. 119 (1977).
89. Id. at 135-36. The Supreme Court in Kremens declined to hear a class action suit,
brought on behalf of all persons under 18 who were committed to Pennsylvania mental
health facilities, alleging that Pennsylvania's Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act
of 1966 was unconstitutional, because a change in the Pennsylvania statute rendered moot
the claims of the nonretarded class members. The court remanded the case for redefinition of the plaintiff class. Id. at 134.
90. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d at 125 (Seitz, C.J.,
dissenting) (the profoundly and severely retarded persons-are dangerous-to-themselves
because they cannot care for themselves and often do not have family members or friends
who are willing and able to help them survive); Note, Civil Restraint Mental Illness and
the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967). But cf. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 296 n.50 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (seventy-five to eighty
percent of retarded children can achieve self-sufficiency withthe 9ropeFeduir tipn and
trainiig). See also Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded.-Some CriticalIssues,
48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 133, 160 (1972) (in order for some mentally_ retarded persons to enjoy their liberty, they must relinqqish somne of their freedoms because realistically they
can only function in a sheltered environment controlled by the state).
In addition to habilitation, some federal courts have considered the need to be
prevented from harming oneself or others as a constitutionally justifiable reason to commit the mentally ill or mentally retarded but have held that this determination does not
preclude the right to treatment to change the dangerous behavior. Eckerhart v. Hensley,
475 F. Supp. 908, 914 (1979). Seventy-four percent of the Pennhurst residents are severely
or profoundly retarded and have I.Q.s below 35. 446 F. Supp. at 1299, 1302.
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unanswered in O'Connor. If the Court finds that habilitation is the constitutional justification for confining the mentally retarded, it must
recognize that alf-in-stitutionaized-retarded have a constitutional right
to habilitation in the least restrictive environment. The Court,
however, may follow the Halderman dissent and hold that custodial
care and supervision of the retarded is the legitimate government objective justifying commitment. If so, the Court will be faced with the
issieit-ileclined to deid67iff O'Connor: Can those individuals who cannot-- sa-fely survive in freedom be confined without receiving
treatment?9'
If the Court finds either a federal statutory or a constitutional right
to habilitation in the least restrictive environment, it must address the
appropriateness of the relief granted by the circuit court. Although
lower federal courts have displayed a willingness to issue extensive
detailed orders to correct perceived constitutional or statutory violations in state institutions, 92 the Supreme Court has indicated that injunctive relief against state legislative and executive branches should
be granted cautiously to avoid infringing on traditional state prerogatives in administering state and local institutions." Federal courts that
have found a right to treatment have recognized that if states refuse
to appropriate funds to implement court orders, the courts will be faced
with the prospect of either ordering state legislatures to make appropriations or seizing state assets to cover the cost of implementing
their orders, resulting in substantial federalism problems.
Thus, if the Supreme Court finds a right to habilitation in the least
restrictive environment, it may decide that methods for implementing
these rights can best be determined by the state governments under
the supervision of local federal courts.95 Another factor militating state
91. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 571 n.6.
92. The district court, which has retained jurisdiction over the Halderman case, has
issued at least eight orders to implement its original decision. See Petitioners' Brief for
Certioriari at 16 & n.11, Commissioners and Mental Health/Mental Retardation Adm'rs
for Bucks County v. Halderman, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980) (No. 79-1415).
93. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48 (1979) (reversing lower court's injunction against some procedures in a center for pretrial detention and declaring that
federal court inquiries into the operation of correctional institutions should be limited to
determining if a particular system violates constitutional rights rather than examining
day-to-day operations); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-80 (1976) (district court erred in
adjudicating the internal disciplinary affairs of the Philadelphia Police Department).
94. Welsch v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122, 1131-32 (8th Cir. 1977); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305, 1318 (5th Cir. 1974). See also note 93 and accompanying text supra.
95. Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299, 301 (1955) (remanding to local
courts to allow for flexibility in meeting local conditions and placing responsibility on local
school officials to solve problems in implementing newly recognized constitutional rights).
But cf. Swann v. Charlott-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 27-31 (1971) (discussing
remedies which may be ordered by district courts where de jure segregation exists and
local school authorities have failed to submit a plan to correct it).
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government control rather than federal judicial control is the possibility of increased demand on the states' mental health resources to accommodate those retarded individuals who demand placement in newly
created community living arrangements. 6 The circuit court in Halderman noted that the development of community living arrangements
will not place a financial burden on the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 7 It is conceivable, however, that the declaration of a constitutional or statutory right to the least restrictive environment could
result in an incalculable financial impact on Pennsylvania and other
states which will be bound by the Supreme Court's ruling. 8
There are, however, differences in impact between a constitutional
right and a statutory right. A constitutional right to the least restrictive environment would extend only to the institutionalized retarded.9
The Supreme Court may follow the district court in Halderman and
find that an institution is never the least restrictive setting. Or the
Court may accept the circuit court's presumption that for most institutionalized retarded individuals a large state-run institution is not the
least restrictive environment."' In either case states will have to
create new community living arrangements for their present mental
retardation institution populations. The plaintiff class includes those
persons eligible for admission to Pennhurst, many of whom may have
been cared for private institutions or by their relatives at home to
avoid the deplorable conditions documented in this litigation. Their
families may now demand that these persons be placed in state supported community living arrangements to effectuate their right to
habilitation in the least restrictive enmvironment, 01' thereby further increasing the financial impact on the state. If, however, the Supreme
96. Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 8 n.5, Commissioners and Mental Health/Mental Retardation Adm'rs for Bucks County v. Halderman, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980) (No.
79-1415).
97. 612 F.2d at 116 n.39.
98. Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 7-8, Commissioners and Mental Health/Mental
Retardation Adm'rs for Bucks County v. Halderman, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980) (No. 79-1415).
There are 6.75 million retarded persons in the United States of which only 150,000 reside
in state institutions for the retarded. If even a small number of this vast majority of
noninstitutionalized retarded citizens demand publicly funded services to effectuate their
statutory right to habilitation in the least restrictive setting, there will be an immense
fiscal impact on the states. This is so whether the states have a duty to provide habilitation in the least restrictive environment to all retarded persons, or only to the plaintiff
class members. See note 1 supra. See also United States Brief in Opposition at 13 n.11,
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980) (No. 79-1415).
99. See text accompanying notes 60 & 61 supra.
100. 612 F.2d at 115.
101. Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 8 n.5, Commissioners and Mental Health/Mental Retardation Adm'rs for Bucks County v. Halderman, 100 S. Ct, 2984 (1980) (No.
79-1415).
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Court, as federal courts other than the Third Circuit have done, limits
the right to the least restrictive environment to the least restrictive
conititUsfional setting the state can provide, the impact on the states
will-ber-educed. 02 The financial impact on the states will be greater if the Supreme
Court upholds a federal statutory right to habilitation in the least
restrictive environment under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, because the Act extends the right to all
developmentally disabled." 3 Although the Court's holding will be confined to those represented by the plaintiff class in the Halderman
suit,"' the practical result of finding a right under the Act would be to
open the door to future suits by anyone covered under the Act.
If the Halderman decision is affirmed, Pennsylvania will have to
reorder its financial priorities to cover the cost of creating additional
community living arrangements.' 5 Other states will also be financially
affected."' But the mentally retarded in every state will have a right
to habilitation in the least restrictive environment with the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act standardizing the
07 If theSupreme Court declines to find a
effectuation of that right.1
statutory-or a constitutional right to habilitation, the nation's mentally
retarded will once again be at the mercy of fifty state legislatures.
Some may legislate to insure that the retarded reach their fullest
potential in home-like environments, but others may permit the continuation of mere custodial care ii large institutions which foster mental, emotional, and physical deterioration."'
Julianne Hallenbeck Palmer
102. See notes 67 & 68 and accompanying text supra.
103. See note 63 and text accompanying notes 63 & 64 supra.
104. Because of the case in controversy restriction, the Supreme Court will only adjudicate the rights of the litigants before it. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 (1975).
105. See note 98 supra.
106. All 50 states accept funding under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act. If Halderman is affirmed, they will be bound to create any new
facilities necessary to effectuate the rights of their retarded citizens to habilitation in the
least restrictive environment. Commonwealth Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 9 & 10
n.8; Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 100 S. Ct. 2984 (1980) (No. 79-1404).
107. See notes 25, 26 & 39 supra for text of applicable sections of the Act.
108. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. at 1309-11.

